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ABSTRACT 
 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a widely used semi-quantitative risk 
assessment method. LOPA includes both frequency and consequence expressed in an 
order of magnitude approximation. Compared with Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA), 
LOPA provides a simplified but less precise method to assess the effectiveness of 
protection layers and the risk reduction of an incident scenario. The outcome frequency 
and consequence of LOPA are intended to be conservative, which makes the risk 
overestimated.  A high risk indicates the requirement of additional Independent Protection 
Layers (IPLs), which calls for higher installation and maintenance costs. There are 
different sources and types of uncertainty in LOPA model that need to be identified and 
quantified. 
Fuzzy logic is a method to deal with systems that are too complex or not clearly 
defined. Using fuzzy arithmetic, imperfect data are analyzed in a natural and flexible way. 
Through the application of fuzzy logic, uncertainty from data and experience from experts 
can be quantified, and a more accurate and precise risk value can be obtained. Various 
types of fuzzy logic systems, including type-1 fuzzy logic and type-2 fuzzy logic are 
studied in this work. 
The goal of this work is to increase the accuracy and precision of LOPA model 
while retaining its simplicity. A probabilistic and fuzzy logic hybrid approach is developed 
to deal with the uncertainty in failure rate data. This method facilitates a more accurate 
and precise failure rate database considering generic database, plant-specific data and 
 iii 
 
expert experience. It has been applied to a distillation system, with a capacity to distill 40 
tons of flammable n-hexane, and the results show that a more accurate failure rate can be 
achieved with the available data and expert judgment. Furthermore, a type-2 fuzzy logic 
risk matrix is developed to increase the precision of a risk matrix. This new method also 
provides an efficient way to aggregate several risk matrices into one universal risk matrix. 
Its application to aggregate three standard risk matrices has been shown through a case 
study.  
 This work demonstrates the effectiveness of applying fuzzy logic in quantifying 
uncertainty in layer failure data to be used in LOPA. Fuzzy logic can also be helpful in 
other types of risk assessment.  
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1. INTRODUCTION * 
 
Our world is expanding with new technologies, products and services, 
accommodating a highly developing global economy, and at the same time imposing 
increasing risks to human life, economy, and enviroment. It is especially true in chemical 
and petrochemical industries, where a wide range of toxic and flammable materials are 
processed. Examples of recent incidents include BP Texas City-USA (2005) [1], 
Buncefield-UK (2005) [2], and Formosa Plastics Illiopolis-USA (2007) [3]. Safety plays 
a key role in industrial production, and therefore, more reliable and effective safety 
systems as well as risk assessment tools should be developed to prevent incidents.  
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a widely used semi-quantitative risk 
assessment method. It provides a simplified and less precise method to assess the 
effectiveness of protection layers and the residual risk of an incident scenario. The 
outcome failure frequency and consequence of that residual risk are intended to be 
conservative by prudently selecting input data, given that design specification and 
component manufacturer’s data are often overly optimistic. There are many influences, 
including design deficiencies, lack of layer independence, availability, human factors, 
wear by testing and maintenance shortcomings, which are not quantified and are 
dependent on type of process and location. This makes the risk in a conservative approach 
                                                 
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “A fuzzy logic and probabilistic hybrid approach to 
quantify the uncertainty in layer of protection analysis” by Yizhi Hong, Hans J. Pasman, Sonny Sachdeva, 
Adam S. Markowski, and M. Sam Mannan, 2016. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 43, 
Copyright 2016 by Elsevier. 
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usually overestimated. Therefore, to make decisions for a cost-effective system, different 
sources and types of uncertainty in the LOPA model need to be identified and quantified. 
The objective of this study is first to quantify the uncertainty in LOPA, and second to keep 
the modified LOPA method simple. 
 
1.1. Uncertainty in LOPA 
 
Markowski divided uncertainty from all the sources in process safety analysis into 
three types [4]: completeness uncertainty, modeling uncertainty, and parameter 
uncertainty. The completeness uncertainty refers to the question of whether all significant 
phenomena and all relationships have been considered. Modeling uncertainty refers to 
deficiency and inadequacies in the models assumptions that are used in risk analysis and 
consequence analysis. Parameter uncertainty is the imprecision and inaccuracies in the 
parameters which are used as input in models.  
Uncertainty exists in each step of LOPA model as it is a semi-quantitative risk 
assessment method. LOPA methodology is based on certain assumptions, such as, how 
each scenario has a single initiating event. However, many causes can occur at the same 
time in a real incident. The performance of a specific instrument can depend on operating 
conditions and the environment of processes, which are not considered in the LOPA 
model. These are examples of modeling uncertainty and completeness uncertainty. 
Parameter uncertainty could happen in the data acquisition and measurement approach. In 
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traditional LOPA models, numbers are usually selected to estimate failure probabilities 
conservatively in order to get a reliable result [5].  
 
1.2. Chances vs. Fuzzy Logic 
 
Achieving high levels of precision costs significant amounts of time and money. 
By accepting some level of imprecision, problems can be solved more efficiently and 
effectively. Theories and models have been developed to describe uncertainty, and Zadeh 
introduced fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic in 1965 [6]. Fuzzy logic was developed to deal with 
systems that are very complex or not clearly defined. It provides an effective means for 
conflict resolution of multiple criteria and better assessment of options. In case of lack of 
data, this enables experts to express their estimate of a parameter value in a semi-
quantitative way by linguistic terms on an ordinal scale. Fuzzy logic is an effective method 
to quantify such expressions. Fuzzy logic theory has wide-spread applications in process 
safety analysis, including event tree analysis, fault tree analysis, fuzzy risk matrix, bow-
tie analysis, etc. [7-23].  
Fuzzy logic admits degrees of truth, and allows a proposition to be partially true 
and partially false at the same time. It challenges not only the probability theory, but also 
the classical binary logic [24]. The probability theory, based on a binary logic that admits 
only true or false, was the leading theory form the late 19th century to the late 20th century. 
A comparison between a classical binary set and a fuzzy set can be found in Figure 1. A 
Boolean set, also known as a classical set, is defined with crisp boundaries, while a fuzzy 
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set is described by gradually shaded boundaries. For a Boolean set, an element inside the 
set A indicates that it is a member of A; otherwise it is not a member of A. However, for a 
fuzzy set ?̅?, an element in the shaded part indicates that it partly belongs to ?̅?. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Diagrams for a Boolean set and a fuzzy set. 
 
 
 
There are two types of fuzzy logic, including type-1 fuzzy logic and type-2 fuzzy 
logic. When there are uncertainties in the problem, type-1 fuzzy sets can be applied to 
describe the parameters. Similarly, when the situation in the problem is very complex and 
the membership functions of type-1 fuzzy sets are difficult to determine, type-2 fuzzy sets 
can be applied. In this study, both types of fuzzy logic are used to describe the uncertainty 
in LOPA. One type-1 fuzzy set is used to describe the experience from one expert, and 
type-2 fuzzy sets are used to describe multiple expert experiences. 
 
1.3. Dissertation Outline 
 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
introduction to various types of risk assessment and the basic conceptions and procedures 
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of Layer of Protection Analysis. Section 3 provides a brief introduction to the most basic 
concepts and operations of type-1 fuzzy logic and type-2 fuzzy logic. Section 4 introduces 
a fuzzy logic and probabilistic hybrid approach to determine the mean and to quantify the 
uncertainty of frequency. Section 5 introduces a type-2 fuzzy logic based approach to 
develop a universal risk matrix. Finally, Section 6 draws conclusions and proposes future 
works. 
 
 6 
 
2. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE OF LOPA * 
 
This section provides a brief introduction to various types of risk assessment and 
the basic concepts and procedures of Layer of Protection Analysis. 
 
2.1. Risk Assessment 
 
Risk is formally defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives (ISO 
31000:2009) [25]. Typically, risk assessment is trying to answer three questions: 
 What can go wrong? 
 How frequent is the incident? 
 What’s the consequence of the incident? 
For this work, risk is interpreted as a measure of the severity and probability of 
occurrence of an event that causes consequences, such as human injury, environmental 
damage, or economic loss. Besides the inherent uncertainty of risk, there is the possible 
spread in the derived values of both probability and consequence as a secondary source of 
uncertainty. For a specific scenario, risk is the function of consequence and probability, 
and the probability is expressed per unit of time, hence as frequency [26, 27]. Risk being 
a key concept in process safety, engineering decisions should be taken with a well 
understood and assessed risk. 
                                                 
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “A fuzzy logic and probabilistic hybrid approach to 
quantify the uncertainty in layer of protection analysis” by Yizhi Hong, Hans J. Pasman, Sonny Sachdeva, 
Adam S. Markowski, and M. Sam Mannan, 2016. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 43, 
Copyright 2016 by Elsevier. 
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To a specific scenario, risk is a function of frequency and consequence. Thus risk 
assessment consists of hazard identification and consequence analysis. In hazard 
identification, scenarios are developed and the frequency of events are determined. In 
consequence analysis, the damage of the incidents is qualitatively or quantatitvely 
described in terms of loss of life, economic loss, and damge to the environment [26]. 
 There are various risk assessment tools and they can be briefly divided into three 
categories: qualitative analysis, semi-quantitative analysis, and quantitative analysis 
methods, as shown in Figure 2. Typically, all possible incidents need to be considered. 
Each incident can be the result of a multiple of scenarios starting at different root causes 
or their combinations. All scenarios are identified and analyzed qualitatively, and some 
scenarios resulting in more serious incidents need semi-quantitative analysis. For 
obtaining an overall risk of an operation and possible severe incidents one proceeds to 
quantitative analysis. Some well-known and accepted risk assessment methods are 
introduced in the following sub-sections. Layer of Protection Analysis is a semi-
quantitative risk assessment approach, and it is discussed in detail in Section 2.3. 
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Figure 2. Spectrum of tools for risk-based decision making [28]. 
 
 
 
2.1.1. Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 
 
HAZOP is the most widely used systematic, qualitative hazard identification 
method, roughly assessing consequence and ways to avoid the hazard appearing. A 
HAZOP study starts from a P&ID of the process and breaks the complex design of process 
into a series of simpler sections, which are then reviewed separately. A HAZOP study is 
carried out by a group of experienced multi-disciplinary team. When identifying the 
deviations, the multi-disciplinary team uses a set of guide words, e.g., NO, REVERSE, 
MORE, LESS, and associates them with some variables, e.g., Flow, Temperature, 
Pressure, Composition. 
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2.1.2. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a highly structured and systematic 
method to analyze the failure modes of equipment and their event sequences. FMEA was 
first developed to study problems that might arise from malfunctions of military systems 
in the late 1950s. A FMEA is mainly a qualitatively analysis, but it can be put on a 
quantitative basis when the failure modes are well developed and failure rate data are 
available. Also the criticality of the failures can be assessed (FMECA). 
 
2.1.3. Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) 
 
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) was developed by Dow Chemical in 
1964 [29]. It is a semi-quantitative index system that is used to evaluate the hazards of 
chemical substances and their processing. It is the most frequently used hazard evaluation 
index and has become a standard method in many countries. The first step is dividing the 
plant into a series of discrete units (i.e., raw material storage, process stream storage, 
reactor feed pumps, reactors, strippers, recovery vessels, flash drums, K.O. drums, others). 
Critical items are then identified for each unit categories considering the chemical 
substances, process conditions, design conditions, past cases, etc. After this, the Material 
Factor, General Process Hazard Factor, Special Process Hazards Factors, Process Unit 
Hazard Factors are calculated. Then the Fire & Explosion Index is calculated by 
 10 
 
multiplying the Process Unit Factor and Material Factor. The method is not suitable to 
consider details. 
 
2.1.4. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was developed by H.A. Watson to evaluate a control 
system [30]. FTA is a type of quantitative risk assessment. FTA is a top down deductive 
system to analyze failure of a system using Boolean logic to propagate a fault in a series 
of events from a basic event upward. Starting from the initiating event, all the events are 
connected by using AND and OR gates. The development of FTA is a time-consuming 
process and it requires experts who know the methodology and are familiar with the 
process under analysis. With a well-developed Fault Tree and proven failure rate and 
equipment reliability data, the frequency of the top event can be calculated accurately.   
 
2.2. Risk Matrix 
 
Risk matrices are widely used in risk evaluation and assessment. They have been 
included in various risk management guidelines and standards, such as IEC 60812 and 
ISO (2010), and are used as formal corporate risk acceptance decision making tools [31, 
32]. Risk matrix is a simple tool to rank and prioritize risk of different scenarios and 
events, and support risk-based decision making. Risk matrix has been widely used in 
different process hazard analysis (PHA), including LOPA. 
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A risk matrix uses discrete categories of risk, consequence, and frequency, and 
presents them graphically. Figure 3 shows an example of a risk matrix. The vertical side 
is the Frequency, and the horizontal side is the Consequence. Risk is divided into 4 
categories: Not acceptable (NA), Tolerable not acceptable (TNA), tolerable (TA), 
acceptable (A); frequency is divided into 7 categories: Remote (A), Unlikely (B), Very 
Low (C), Low (D), Medium (E), High (F), very High (G)); consequence is divided into 5 
categories: Negligible (I), Low (II), Moderate (III), High (IV), Catastrophic (V). The 
following examples of reading the risk matrix shown in Figure 3:  
IF “Frequency” is Remote (A) AND “Consequence” is Negligible (I), THEN 
“Risk” is Acceptable (A). 
IF “Frequency” is Medium (E) AND “Consequence” is Low (II), THEN “Risk” is 
Tolerable not acceptable (TNA). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Risk matrix example I. 
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A risk matrix can be developed through the following steps: 
1) Scaling and categorization of the severity of consequence; 
2) Scaling and categorization of the frequency; 
3) Scaling and categorization of the outcome risk index; 
4) Developing the risk-based rules based on expert knowledge and standards; 
5) Graphical presentation of the risk matrix. 
  
Each step can be filled in by different experts in a different manner. A risk matrix 
has two main functions. One is to prioritize the risk for different events or scenarios; the 
other is to support the risk decision making by providing the acceptance criteria of risk. 
As described in section 2.1, risk is defined as a function of consequence and frequency. 
Cox[33], and Levine [34] calculate risk as the multiplication of probability and 
consequence. In a risk matrix, the risk is defined as a mapping of categories of 
consequence and frequency to category of risk. The mapping is based on subject-matter 
experts (SME) and industrial standards.  
 
2.3. Layer of Protection Analysis 
 
LOPA, as described in the IEC61511 standard [35], is a semi-quantitative 
technique for analyzing and assessing risk. In LOPA, both frequency and consequence are 
expressed as an order of magnitude. Usually LOPA is conducted after a HAZOP study has 
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revealed a particular hazard that can appear in a scenario with such high frequency that 
the resulting risk must be reduced. LOPA is trying to answer three questions: 
 What is the safety criterion? 
 How many protection layers are needed? 
 How much risk reduction could the protection layers provide? 
As defined by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) [28] , the primary 
purpose of LOPA is to determine whether there are sufficient independent protection 
layers (IPLs) to reduce risk to a tolerable level for a selected incident scenario. An IPL is 
a protection layer whose probability of failure is independent of those of the initiating 
event and other layers of protection associated with the selected scenario.  Figure 4 shows 
some typical IPLs in a plant. They are process design, basic process control system, critical 
alarms and human intervention, safety instrumented function (SIF), physical protection, 
post-release physical protection, plant emergency response, community emergency 
response. 
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Figure 4. Layers of protection for a possible incident [28]. 
 
 
 
LOPA is applied to a single cause-consequence pair at a time. The outcome risk is 
compared with an acceptable or maximum tolerable risk. If the estimated risk of a selected 
scenario is too high, additional IPLs will be added to the process. Based on the assumption 
of independence, the failure frequency of the array of layers can be calculated by 
multiplying the frequency of the initiating event with the values of the individual 
probability of failure on demand.  
As shown in Figure 5, LOPA can be applied to various stages in the process life, 
including research, process development, process design, operations, maintenance, 
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modifications, and decommissioning. However, LOPA is most frequently used during the 
process design stage and modification stage. In the design stage when a process flow 
diagram and a P&ID are available, LOPA is used to examine scenarios; in the modification 
stage, LOPA is applied to make sure enough IPLs are available to keep the risk in a 
tolerable range.  LOPA is conducted by a team, thus the outcome from different teams can 
be slightly different. Due to this fact, it is important to keep the LOPA analysis consistent 
throughout the assessment. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The process life cycle showing where LOPA is typically used [2]. 
 
 
 
As mentioned, LOPA is applied to a single cause-consequence pair at a time, and 
usually the most significant scenario is selected to calculate the risk. Each IPL reduces the 
frequency of the event if it is successful. The traditional LOPA methodology consists of 
six steps: 
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Step 1: Estimating consequences and severity. The category consequence is 
evaluated on a magnitude approximation. There are different endpoints for consequence 
analysis. Some companies are only interested in loss of containment, while other 
companies will further model the release and consider the fatalities, environmental impact, 
and economic loss. Either way is acceptable, but it is important to keep on a consistent 
basis for the whole LOPA process. 
Step 2: Selecting a scenario. An incident scenario is a series of events, including 
initiating events and the failure of barriers and undesirable consequences. After we have 
a list of scenarios, LOPA is applied to one scenario at a time.  
Step 3: Identifying initiating event and its frequency. Initiating events are not root 
causes, and it should be avoided to go too far into root causes. Sometimes, enabling 
events/conditions of initiating events should be considered. For LOPA, each scenario has 
a single initiating event.  
Step 4: Identifying IPLs and estimating the probability of failure on demand. It is 
very important to identify the distinction between an IPL and a safeguard. IPLs, as 
safeguards, should satisfy the criteria of effectiveness, independence, and auditability [28]. 
A general step is to identify a list of safeguards first and then to screen safeguards to IPLs 
based on certain rules.  
Step 5: Determining the frequency of scenarios. The risk of a scenario is calculated 
based on the data collected in the former steps. The frequency for a consequence can be 
calculated through Eq. (2-1).  
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Eq. (2-1) 𝑓𝑖
𝐶 = 𝑓𝑖
𝐼 × ∏ 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑗 =
𝐽
𝑗=1 𝑓𝑖
𝐼 × 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖1 × 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖2 × … × 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖𝐽 
 𝑓𝑖
𝐶
 : the frequency for consequence C for initiating event i 
 𝑓𝑖
𝐼
 : the initiating event frequency for initiating event i; 
 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑗: the probability of failure on demand (PFD) of the jth IPL for initiating 
event i. 
 
LOPA can also be represented in a quantitative way, as shown in Figure 6. All 
the possible consequences for a given initiating event in an event tree are shown in the 
figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. LOPA pictured as an event tree analysis [28]. 
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Step 6: Making risk-based decisions using LOPA. The risk can be estimated using 
a risk matrix, and the value compared with the risk criteria of a company. If the risk is not 
tolerable, further actions are taken, such as adding a new IPL to reduce the risk. 
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3. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE OF FUZZY LOGIC 
 
This section provides a brief introduction to the most basic concepts and operations 
of type-1 fuzzy logic and type-2 fuzzy logic that is necessary for the understanding of this 
project. 
 
3.1. Classical Boolean Set 
 
The theory of fuzzy logic is parallel to the theory of Boolean sets. Boolean sets are 
based on a binary logic that admits only true and false, was the leading theory from the 
late 19th century and the late 20th century. Fuzzy logic admits degrees of truth, and allows 
a proposition to be partially true and partially false at the same time [24]. Important 
concepts of Boolean set theory are introduced in this sub-section first. 
 
Definition 3.1: Boolean set 
A Boolean set, also known as a crisp set, is represented as a collection of elements, 𝑎𝑖 , in 
a universe of discourse, U: 
Eq. (3-1) 𝒜 = { 𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , 𝑎3 , … , 𝑎𝑛 } 
  
Table 1 shows the symbols and definition of Boolean sets symbols and set 
relations. In this table, 𝓐 and 𝓑 are two Boolean sets in the universe, U, while a and 
b are element in the universe.  
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Table 1. Boolean sets symbols and set relations. 
Symbol Symbol Name Definition 
{ } Set A collection of elements 
U Universe set A collection of all possible values 
Ø Empty set No element in an empty set. Ø = { } 
𝓐 ⊆ 𝓑 Subset Subset 𝓐 has fewer or equal elements than set 𝓑 
𝓐 ⊂ 𝓑 Proper subset Subset 𝓐 has fewer elements than set 𝓑 
𝓐 ⊄ 𝓑 Not subset Set 𝓐 is not a subset of set 𝓑 
𝓐 = 𝓑 Equality Set 𝓐 and Set 𝓑 has the same elements 
a 𝜖 𝓐 Element of Set membership 
a ∉ 𝓐 Not element of  Not set membership 
(a, b) Ordered pair A collection of two elements  
𝓐 × 𝓑 Cartesian product Set of all ordered pairs from 𝓐 and 𝓑 
| 𝓐 | Cardinality  The number of elements of set 𝓐 
 
 
 
The operations of set 𝓐 and set 𝓑 can be found in Table 2. The main operations 
are union, intersection, complement and difference. The union of set 𝓐 and set 𝓑, denoted 
𝓐 ∪ 𝓑, represents all elements that belong to both set 𝓐 and set 𝓑. The intersection of 
two sets, denoted 𝓐 ∩ 𝓑, represents all elements that belong to set 𝓐 or set 𝓑. The 
complement of set 𝓐, denoted ?̅?, represents all the elements in the universe U that does 
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not belong to set 𝓐. The difference of set 𝓐 with set 𝓑, denoted 𝓐|𝓑, represents a 
collection of elements that belong to 𝓐 and do not belong to 𝓑 simultaneously.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Boolean set operations. 
Symbol Symbol Name Definition 
𝓐 ∪ 𝓑 Union 𝓐 ∪ 𝓑 = {a | a 𝜖 𝓐 or a 𝜖 𝓑} 
𝓐 ∩ 𝓑 Intersection 𝓐 ∩ 𝓑 = {a | a 𝜖 𝓐 and a 𝜖 𝓑} 
?̅? Complement ?̅? = {a | a ∉ 𝓐, a 𝜖 U} 
𝓐 | 𝓑 Difference 𝓐 | 𝓑 = {a | a 𝜖 𝓐 and a ∉ 𝓑} 
 
 
 
The most important properties for defining Boolean sets are associativity, 
distributivity, commutativity, indempotency, identity, transitivity, and involution. Boolean 
sets also follow two special properties of set operations, known as excluded middle axioms 
and De Morgan’s principles. Among all these properties, the excluded middle axioms are 
the only properties that are not valid for fuzzy sets operations. The excluded middle axioms 
consist of the axiom of the excluded middle and the axiom of the contradiction. Let 𝓐, 𝓑 
and 𝓒 be three Boolean sets on the universe U. All the properties and their definitions can 
be found in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 22 
 
Table 3. Properties of Boolean sets. 
Property Definition 
Associativity 𝓐 ∪ (𝓑 ∪ 𝓒) = (𝓐 ∪ 𝓑) ∪ 𝓒 
𝓐 ∩ (𝓑 ∩ 𝓒) = (𝓐 ∩ 𝓑) ∩ 𝓒 
Distributivity 𝓐 ∪ (𝓑 ∩ 𝓒) = (𝓐 ∪ 𝓑) ∩ (𝓐 ∪ 𝓒) 
𝓐 ∩ (𝓑 ∪ 𝓒) = (𝓐 ∩ 𝓑) ∪ (𝓐 ∩ 𝓒) 
Commutativity 𝓐 ∪ 𝓑 = 𝓑 ∪ 𝓐 
𝓐 ∩ 𝓑 = 𝓑 ∩ 𝓐 
Idempotency 𝓐 ∪ 𝓐 = 𝓐 
𝓐 ∩ 𝓐 = 𝓐 
Identity 𝓐 ∪ Ø = 𝓐 
𝓐 ∩ U = 𝓐 
Transitivity If 𝓐 ⊆ 𝓑 and 𝓑 ⊆ 𝓒, then 𝓐 ⊆ 𝓒 
Involution 𝓐 = 𝓐 
Axiom of the excluded 
middle 
𝓐 ∪ ?̅? = U 
Axiom of the contradiction 𝓐 ∩ ?̅? = Ø 
De Morgan’s principles 𝓐 ∩ 𝓑 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ?̅? ∪ ?̅? 
𝓐 ∪ 𝓑 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ?̅? ∩ ?̅? 
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3.2. Type-1 Fuzzy Logic 
 
Fuzzy set theory challenges not only the probability theory, but also the classical 
binary logic. A comparison between a classical binary set and a fuzzy set can be found in 
Figure 7. In this figure, set 𝓐 is a Boolean set, and set B is fuzzy set. A Boolean set is 
defined with crisp boundaries, while a fuzzy set is described by gradually shaded 
boundaries. For a Boolean set, an element inside the set A indicates that it is a member of 
A, otherwise it is not a member of A. However, for a fuzzy set B, an element in the shaded 
part indicates that it partly belongs to B. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Diagrams for a Boolean set and a type-1 fuzzy set. 
 
 
 
Another way to understand the difference between Boolean sets and fuzzy sets is 
through the membership function µ(x). In a Boolean set, the membership function µ(x)=1 
when the element x belongs to the set A, and membership function µ(x)=0 when the 
element x does not belong to the set A. However, partial membership function µ(x), which 
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can be any value between 0 and 1. Figure 8 shows the membership function µ(x) of a 
Boolean set and a fuzzy set. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Membership function of a crisp set and a fuzzy set. 
 
 
 
There are two types of fuzzy sets, type-1 fuzzy set and type-2 fuzzy set. Important 
concepts of type-1 fuzzy set theory are introduced in this sub-section. 
 
3.2.1. Type-1 Fuzzy Set 
 
Definition 3.2: Type-1 fuzzy set 
In the universe of disclosure, U, a type-1 fuzzy set A is defined as a set of ordered pair of 
the element and its membership function: 
Eq. (3-2)  A = { (𝑥, µA(𝑥)) | 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈 } 
 x: element of type-1 fuzzy set. 
 µA(𝑥): membership function of the type-1 fuzzy set A. 
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An alternative way to represent a type-1 fuzzy set A is through the following two 
equations. In Eq. (3-3), the element x is discrete; while in Eq. (3-4), x is continuous.  
Eq. (3-3) A = {
µ𝐴(𝑥1)
𝑥1
+
µ𝐴(𝑥2)
𝑥2
+ ⋯ +
µ𝐴(𝑥𝑛)
𝑥𝑛
} = {∑
µ𝐴(𝑥𝑖)
𝑥𝑖
𝑖 } 
Eq. (3-4) A = {∫ µA(𝑥)/𝑥} 
 µA(𝑥): membership function of the type fuzzy set A. 
 
µ𝐴(𝑥𝑖)
𝑥𝑖
: The division sign is not the mathematical operation of division. It 
means element xi with its membership function µ𝐴(𝑥𝑖).  
 ∫  : a symbol indicates the collection of all points x 𝜖 U with associated 
membership function µA(𝑥).  
 
Figure 9 shows a typical membership function of a fuzzy set. Some important 
definitions of a type-1 fuzzy set include “support” and “core”. The “support” of a type-1 
fuzzy set is all the points x with its membership function larger than 0. The “core” of a 
type-1 fuzzy set is all the points x with its membership function equal to 1. 
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Figure 9. Core, support of a typical type-1 fuzzy set. 
 
 
 
Definition 3.3: Support 
The “support” of a type-1 fuzzy set is all the points x in U that µA(𝑥)>0: 
support(A) = {𝑥 | µA(𝑥) > 0} 
Definition 3.4: Core 
The “core” of a type-1 fuzzy set is all points x in U that µA(𝑥)=1: 
core(A) = {𝑥 | µA(𝑥) = 0} 
 
Different shapes of membership functions can be used to establish fuzzy sets. 
Figure 10 represents the most commonly used shapes [36]. These are triangular, bell 
curves, trapezoid, Gaussian, and sigmoid. The selection of the shapes of the membership 
function is based on data and expert experience.  
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Figure 10. Membership function shapes [36]. 
 
 
 
One major advantage of the fuzzy logic system in modeling is the use of linguistic 
variables. A linguistic variable can be expressed by fuzzy sets allowing the fuzzy system 
to model with words or sentences in a natural language. For example, we can use linguistic 
variables to describe Age by “young”, “mature”, and “old”. As shown in Figure 11, three 
Gaussian combination membership functions are used to describe “young”, “mature”, 
and “old”, respectively.  
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Figure 11. Membership function of three linguistic terms for Age. 
 
 
 
The following three equations Eq. (3-5,6,7) are the mathematical expression of the 
three linguistic terms. The partial membership permits a numeric value to belong to more 
than one set. As shown in Figure 11, 60 years old partially belongs to “mature”, and 
partially belongs to “old”. 
Eq. (3-5) µ("𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔", 𝑥) = {
1 , 0 < 𝑥 < 10
  
𝑒
−(𝑥−10)2
200 , 𝑥 ≥ 10
 
 
Eq. (3-6) µ("𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒", 𝑥) = {
𝑒
−(𝑥−30)2
128 , 0 < 𝑥 ≤ 30
 1 , 30 < 𝑥 ≤ 50 
𝑒
−(𝑥−50)2
128 , 𝑥 > 50
 
 
Eq. (3-7) µ("𝑜𝑙𝑑", 𝑥) = {
𝑒
−(𝑥−70)2
200 , 0 < 𝑥 < 70
  
1 , 70 ≤ 𝑥 < 80
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3.2.2. Basic Operations and Properties 
 
The basic fuzzy sets operations are union, intersection, and complement. Figure 
12 illustrates the standard fuzzy sets operations. Fuzzy set A and fuzzy set B are two fuzzy 
sets defined in the universe, U. In this figure, the results of the fuzzy set operations are 
marked in blue. Similar with the classical Boolean set operation, the standard fuzzy set 
union is based on maximum operation, the standard fuzzy set intersection is based on 
minimum operation, and the standard fuzzy set complement is based on complement 
operator. The standard fuzzy union is represented by the logic OR, while the standard 
fuzzy intersection is represented by logic AND. Table 4 shows the mathematical 
operations of type-1 fuzzy set operations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Type-1 fuzzy set operations: intersection (AND), union (OR) and 
complement. 
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Table 4. The standard operation of type-1 fuzzy sets. 
Fuzzy operations Definition 
Standard fuzzy intersection of set A 
and B 
(A ∩ B)(𝑥) = min [A(𝑥), B(𝑥)]   for all x 𝜖 U 
Standard fuzzy union of set A and B (A ∪ B)(𝑥) = max [A(𝑥), B(𝑥)]   for all x 𝜖 U 
Standard fuzzy complement of set A A(𝑥) = 1 −  A(𝑥)  for all x 𝜖 U 
 
 
 
Besides the standard fuzzy set union, intersection, and complement, there are some 
customized definition of fuzzy set operation based on dependent context and application. 
The empirical justification of these types of operations is based on either axiomatic 
definition or intuitive design. The family of fuzzy union operations is known as t-
connorms, while the family of fuzzy intersection operations is known as t-norms [37]. 
Let A, B and C be three fuzzy sets in the Universe, U. Table 5 shows the properties 
of fuzzy sets. The important properties for fuzzy sets are associativity, distributivity, 
commutativity, indempotency, identity, transitivity, involution, and De Morgan’s 
principles. The only properties that apply for Boolean sets but not apply for fuzzy sets are 
the excluded middle axioms, including the axiom of the excluded middle and the axiom of 
the contradiction. The following two equations express these two axioms for fuzzy sets: 
Eq. (3-8) A ∪ A ̅ ≠ U 
Eq. (3-9) A ∩ A ̅ ≠ ∅ 
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Table 5. Properties of fuzzy sets. 
Property Definition 
Associativity A ∪  (B ∪  C) = (A ∪  B) ∪  C 
A ∩ (B ∩ C) = (A ∩ B) ∩ C 
Distributivity A ∪  (B ∩ C) = (A ∪  B) ∩ (A ∪  C) 
A ∩ (B ∪  C) = (A ∩ B) ∪  (A ∩ C) 
Commutativity A ∪  B = B ∪  A 
A ∩ B = B ∩ A 
Indempotency A ∪  A = A 
A ∩ A = A 
Identity A ∪  Ø = A 
A ∩ U = A 
Transitivity If A ⊆ B and B ⊆ C, then A ⊆ C 
Involution A = A 
Morgan’s principles A ∩ B ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = A̅ ∪ B̅ 
A ∪ B ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = A̅ ∩ B̅ 
 
 
3.2.3. Type-1 Fuzzy Rules and Reasoning 
 
In this section, type-1 fuzzy rules and reasoning are introduced, including fuzzy 
extension principal and α-cut Decomposition Theorem. The fuzzy rules and reasoning are 
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important for the arithmetic operations with fuzzy sets. Fuzzy rules and reasoning are the 
backbone of the fuzzy inferences, which are the key steps in the fuzzy logic modeling. 
 
3.2.3.1. Fuzzy Relations 
 
In addition, arithmetic operations are possible with fuzzy sets through the 
extension principle. The extension principle permits the fuzzification of mathematical 
structures based on set theory. A basic concept of fuzzy set theory provides steps to extend 
mathematical expression of crisp domains to fuzzy domains. Assume that 𝑓 is a function 
from X to Y, as defined in Eq. (3-10). 
Eq. (3-10) A =
µ𝐴(𝑥1)
𝑥1
+
µ𝐴(𝑥2)
𝑥2
+ ⋯ +
µ𝐴(𝑥𝑛)
𝑥𝑛
                                               
Through the mapping 𝑓, the fuzzy set A can be expressed as a fuzzy set B as 
Eq. (3-11) 
Eq. (3-11) 𝐵 = 𝑓(𝐴) =
µ𝐴(𝑥1)
𝑦1
+
µ𝐴(𝑥2)
𝑦2
+ ⋯ +
µ𝐴(𝑥𝑛)
𝑦𝑛
     
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) 
  
If 𝑓 is a many-to-one mapping, which means there exists 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥1 ≠ 𝑥2, and 
𝑓(𝑥1) = 𝑓(𝑥2) = 𝑦
∗,  𝑦∗ ∈ 𝑌. In this situation, the membership function of B at  𝑦 = 𝑦∗ 
is the maximum of the membership function of A at 𝑥 = 𝑥1 and 𝑥 = 𝑥2, since 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑦
∗ 
may result from 𝑥 = 𝑥1 or 𝑥 = 𝑥2, as Eq. (3-12). 
Eq. (3-12) µ𝐵(𝑦) = max (µ𝐴(𝑥)) 
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Besides the extension principle, arithmetic operations with fuzzy sets can be 
obtained through the α-cut Decomposition Theorem, which give the same results by using 
Zadeh’s extension principle [38].    
 
Definition 3.7: “α-cut”  
The “α-cut” of a type-1 fuzzy set A, denoted as A𝛼 , is a crisp set defined by Eq. (3-13). 
An example of the α-cut of a Trapezoid type-1 fuzzy set is shown in Figure 13. 
Eq. (3-13) A𝛼 = {𝑥 | µA(𝑥)  ≥  𝛼} = [𝑎(𝛼), 𝑏(𝛼)] 
 α is a value between 0 and 1. 
 
 
Figure 13. An example of type-1 fuzzy set and an α-cut. 
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Definition 3.8: Indicator function 
Eq. (3-14) 𝐼𝐴(𝛼)(𝑥) =  {
1,   ∀ 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝛼)
0,   ∀ 𝑥 ∉ 𝐴(𝛼)
 
 
 An important application of α-cut and indicator function is that they can be used 
to represent a type-1 fuzzy set. The following theorem is about the representation of a 
type-1 fuzzy set through α-cut and indicator function. 
 
Theorem 1 (type-1 fuzzy set Decomposition Theorem) 
A type-1 fuzzy set can be represented through Eq. (3-15) and Eq. (3-16) [39]. An example 
of the type-1 fuzzy set decomposed by n α-cuts is shown in Figure 14. 
Eq. (3-15)  µA(𝑥|𝛼) =  𝛼𝐼𝐴(𝛼)(𝑥) 
Eq. (3-16)  µA(𝑥) =  ⋃  µA(𝑥|𝛼)𝛼∈[0,1]  
 µA(𝑥|𝛼) is all the points of x of a specific α-cut of the type-1 fuzzy set A. 
 ⋃   Denotes the standard union operator.  
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Figure 14. Illustration of the T1 FS Decomposition Theorem when n α-cuts are used.  
 
 
 
3.2.3.2. Fuzzy Inference 
 
Definition 3.9: Fuzzy If-Then Rules 
A fuzzy if-then rule is presented in the form: 
 If x is A, then y is B. 
 A: linguistic terms defined by fuzzy sets on the universes X, it also named 
premise or antecedent; 
 B: linguistic terms defined by fuzzy sets on the universe Y, it also named 
conclusion or consequent. 
 
There are many types of fuzzy inference systems that have been used in multiple 
applications, among which the most widely used are Mamdani fuzzy inference system 
[40], Sugeno fuzzy inference system (also known as TSK fuzzy system) [41] and 
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Tsukamoto fuzzy inference system[42]. Both Mamdani and Sugeno fuzzy procedures are 
used in this study.  
A two fuzzy inference systems are used to illustrate the Mamdami and Sugeno 
procedures. Three linguistic variables are used in this example. Risk: {Tolerable, Not 
acceptable}; Frequency: {Medium, High}; Consequence: {Moderate, Catastrophic}.  The 
Mamdani model uses if-then rules such as: 
IF “Frequency” is Medium, AND “Consequence” is Moderate, “Risk” is 
Tolerable. 
IF “Frequency” is High, AND “Consequence” is Catastrophic, “Risk” is Not 
acceptable. 
The connector AND can be replaced by OR in some cases, and they are calculated 
by the operation of intersection and union, respectively. Figure 15 is an illustration of how 
a two-rule Mamdani fuzzy inference system derives the overall output “Risk” when 
subjected to two inputs “Frequency” and “Consequence”.   
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Figure 15. Mamdani fuzzy inference system. 
 
 
 
Figure 16 illustrates the procedure of Sugeno (TSK) fuzzy inference system 
derives the overall output “Risk” when subjected to two inputs “Frequency” and 
“Consequence”.  The Sugeno model uses if-then rules such as: 
IF “Frequency” is Medium, AND “Consequence” is Moderate, 
“Risk”=f1(frequency, consequence) 
IF “Frequency” is High, AND “Consequence” is Catastrophic, 
“Risk”=f2(frequency, consequence) 
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Figure 16. Sugeno (TSK) fuzzy inference system. 
 
 
 
3.2.4. Type-1 Fuzzy Modeling 
 
Fuzzy modeling can be implemented by four steps through Matlab Fuzzy logic 
tool box, and the conceptual structure of modeling system is interpreted in Figure 17. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. The structure of type-1 fuzzy logic system. 
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Step1: Fuzzification of input and output variables. Select relevant input and output 
variables as well as the universe of discourses for each variable. Then, determine the 
number of linguistic terms for each input and output variables and establish fuzzy 
membership functions. 
Step 2: Fuzzy inference system. Choose a specific type of fuzzy inference system. 
Design a list of fuzzy if-then rules based on available knowledge and data (common sense, 
knowledge from experts, and physical laws).  
Step 3: Defuzzification of the resultant fuzzy membership function. Translate the 
output from all fuzzy if-then rules into an understandable crisp value. There are many 
different types of defuzzification methods, including max membership principle, centroid 
method, weighted average method, mean max membership, center of sums, center of 
largest area, and first (or last) of maxima [37]. The most commonly used method is 
Centroid (COA) approach, as Eq. (3-17). 
Eq. (3-17) 𝐶𝑂𝐴 =
∫ 𝑥µ𝐶(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
∫ µ𝐶(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
   
 µ𝐶(𝑥) : the resultant membership function of output. 
Note: From the point of view of using all information for a decision, also the quantified 
uncertainty in the outcome, the defuzzification step can be regarded as a disadvantage of 
the method because, although the reading of a crisp value is more clear, by the 
defuzzification the uncertainty information is lost.  
Step 4: Optimization of the whole system.  Through the interview with human 
experts who are familiar with the target systems and more studies, parameters of 
 40 
 
membership functions (MFs) can be further modified and more rules can be incorporated 
into the system. 
 
3.3. Type-2 Fuzzy Logic 
 
This section introduces the basic concepts, and basic operations for the type-2 
fuzzy sets and modeling. Basically, a type-2 fuzzy set is a set in which we also have 
uncertainty about the membership function. A higher degree of approximation can be 
achieved in modeling real world problems. 
 
3.3.1. Type-2 Fuzzy Set 
 
In this study, type-2 fuzzy logic will also be used to modify the LOPA 
methodology. The concept of a type-2 fuzzy set was introduced by Zadeh in 1975 as an 
extension of the concept of the type-1 fuzzy set [43]. The difference between a type-1 
fuzzy set and a type-2 fuzzy set is that the membership grade for each element of the type-
1 set is a crisp number in [0,1], while the membership grade of type-2 set is a fuzzy set in 
[0,1]. Type-1 fuzzy sets can be treated as a first-order approximation to the uncertainty in 
the real life, and type-2 fuzzy sets is a second-order approximation. As illustrated in Figure 
18, we can get a type-2 fuzzy set by blurring a type-1 membership to the left and to the 
right. 
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Figure 18. Type-2 membership function as a blurred type-1 membership function [44]. 
 
 
 
Definition 3.10: A type-2 fuzzy set Ã is characterized by its membership function: 
Eq. (3-18) ?̃? =  ∫  ∫ 𝜇Ã(𝑥, 𝑢)/(𝑥, 𝑢)
 
𝑢∈𝐽𝑥⊆[0,1]
 
𝑥∈𝑈Ã
 
 x: the primary variable, and it has domain 𝑈Ã. 
 u: the secondary variable, and it has domain 𝐽𝑥 ⊆ [0,1] at each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈Ã 
 𝐽𝑥: the primary membership of x, and it is defined in Eq. (3-4) 
 𝜇Ã(𝑥, 𝑢): the secondary membership function of Ã  
 
To better understand the concept of type-2 fuzzy sets and the difference between 
type-1 fuzzy set and type-2 fuzzy set, let’s look at some examples. 
 
Example 1. Consider the case of a type-2 fuzzy set characterized by a half circle 
membership function with a constant radius r, and the center is moving horizontally. 
Eq. (3-19) µ(x)  =  √1 − (𝑥 − 𝑎)2 ;   𝑎 𝜖 [1 , 1.4], µ(x) ≥ 0 
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In this example, the membership grade µ(x) of any specific x can be a number of 
any possible values depends on the value of a. For example,  µ(x) can be any number 
between 0.886 and 0.994 when x equals to 1.5, as shown in the figure 19. In this example, 
the membership grade of the type-2 fuzzy set is an interval. While the membership grade 
of a type-1 fuzzy set is a crisp value.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Type-2 fuzzy set example I. 
 
 
 
Example 2. Consider the case of a fuzzy set characterized by a half circle membership 
function with a constant radius r, and the center is moving vertically, shown in Figure 20. 
Same with example 1, to a specific x value, the membership function µ(x) is an interval.  
Eq. (3-20) µ(x)  =  √1 − (𝑥 − 1)2  −  𝑏 ;   𝑏 𝜖 [0 , 0.4], µ(x) ≥ 0 
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Figure 20. Type-2 fuzzy set example II. 
 
 
 
Example 3. A torus type-2 is a fuzzy set in which the membership grade of every domain 
point is a half circle type-1 membership function, shown in Figure 21. This example shows 
a more complicated case. The membership function µ(x)  is three-dimensional. To a 
specific x value, the membership function µ(x) is a type-1 fuzzy set.  
Eq. (3-21)  
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) = (𝑅 − √𝑥2 + 𝑦2)2 + 𝑧2 − 𝑟2; 𝑅 = 1, 𝑟 = 0.2, 𝑦 ≥ 0, 𝑧 ≥ 0 
 R : the distance from the center of the tube to the center of the torus;  
 r : the radius of the tube.  
 44 
 
 
Figure 21. Type-2 fuzzy logic example III. 
 
 
 
3.3.2. Interval Type-2 Fuzzy Set  
 
Interval type-2 fuzzy set is one in which the membership grade of every domain 
point is a crisp set whose domain is some interval within [0,1]. Both figure 19 and figure 
20 are interval type-2 fuzzy sets. Interval type-2 fuzzy set is a simplified version of type-
2 fuzzy set. The membership function to a specific x value is a crisp set, whose domain is 
an interval between 0 and 1. The fuzzy sets in example 1 and example 2 are interval type-
2 fuzzy sets. Figure 22 shows the comparison of a type-1 Trapezoid fuzzy set and an 
interval type-2 Trapezoid fuzzy set.  
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Figure 22. (a) Type-1 fuzzy set; (b) Interval type-2 fuzzy set. 
 
 
 
An interval type-2 fuzzy set can be treated as a region between two type-1 fuzzy 
sets. As shown in the figure 22(b), the interval type-2 fuzzy set ?̃? can be treated as the 
region between the upper membership function 𝐵 ̅ and the lower membership function. In 
other words, the upper membership function 𝐵 ̅is the upper boundary of an interval type-
2 fuzzy membership function, and the lower membership function Ḇ is the lower boundary 
of an interval type-2 fuzzy membership function. The green region in between is named 
the footprint of uncertainty (FOU). Mathematically, an interval type-2 fuzzy is the union 
of type-1 fuzzy membership function [45]. 
In example 2, the upper membership function is described in Eq. (3-22) and the 
lower membership function is described in Eq. (3-23). And the region in between 𝐵 ̅and 
𝐵 is the FOU. With the definition of FOU, Eq. (3-24) describes a very compact way to 
represent an interval type-2 fuzzy set. 
Eq. (3-22) 𝐵 ̅  =  √1 − (𝑥 − 1)2  ;   𝑏 𝜖 [0 , 0.4], 𝐵 ̅ ≥ 0 
Eq. (3-23) 𝐵   =  √1 − (𝑥 − 1)2 − 0.4 ;   𝑏 𝜖 [0 , 0.4], Ḇ ≥ 0 
Eq. (3-24) ?̃? = 1/𝐹𝑂𝑈(?̃?) 
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 1/𝐹𝑂𝑈(?̃?): The division sign is not the mathematical operation of division. It 
means that the secondary grade equals to 1 for all elements of FOU for set ?̃?. 
 
3.3.3. Basic Operations 
 
In this section we describe the operation of the interval type-2 fuzzy sets, including 
union, intersection and complement.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Standard interval type-2 fuzzy sets operations (a). Interval type-2 fuzzy set ?̃? 
and ?̃?. (b). Standard union of ?̃? and ?̃?. (c). Standard intersection of ?̃? and ?̃?. 
 
 
 
Similar with standard type-1 fuzzy logic operation, interval type-2 fuzzy set union 
is based on maximum operation, interval type fuzzy set intersection is based on minimum 
operation, and interval type-2 fuzzy complement is based on complement operator. The 
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standard fuzzy union is represented by the logic OR, while the standard fuzzy intersection 
is represented by logic AND. Figure 23 shows the set operations of two interval type-2 
fuzzy sets ?̃? and ?̃?. Table 6 shows the mathematical definition of the interval type-2 fuzzy 
set operations. 
 
 
 
Table 6. The standard operation of type-2 fuzzy sets. 
Fuzzy operations Definition 
Standard fuzzy intersection of set ?̃? and?̃? (?̃? ∩ ?̃? )(𝑥) = min [?̃? (𝑥), ?̃?  (𝑥)]   for all 
x 𝜖 X 
Standard fuzzy union of set ?̅?  and ?̃?  (?̃? ∪ ?̃? )(𝑥) = max [?̃?(𝑥), ?̃?  (𝑥)]   for all 
x 𝜖 X 
Standard fuzzy complement of set ?̃? ?̃?(𝑥) = 1 −  ?̃?(𝑥)  for all x 𝜖 X 
 
 
 
3.3.4. Interval Type-2 Fuzzy Reasoning  
 
Theorem 2: Representation Theorem for an interval type-2 fuzzy set[46] 
This theorem allows an interval type-2 fuzzy sets be represented in term of type-1 fuzzy 
sets. Assume x is the primary variable of an interval type-2 fuzzy set Ã, and it is sampled 
at N values, x1, x2, …, xN. µi is the primary memberships at each of x values, and it is 
sampled in Mi values, ui1, ui2, … uiM. Let 𝐴𝑒
𝑗
 denote the jth embedded type-1 fuzzy set for 
Ã. The Ã is represented by the following equation: 
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Eq. (3-25)  
𝐹𝑂𝑈(Ã) = ⋃ 𝐴𝑒
𝑗
𝑛𝐴
𝑗=1
= {𝐴(𝑥), … , 𝐴(𝑥)} ≡ [𝐴(𝑥), 𝐴(𝑥)] 
 𝑛𝐴 : the total number of M. 
 𝐴𝑒
𝑗
 : the jth embedded type-1 fuzzy set for Ã. 
 
Same with type-1 fuzzy set, there are different types of fuzzy inference systems 
for type-2 fuzzy modeling, including Mamdani inference and Sugeno (TSK) inference. 
The consequent of a Mamdani rule is a fuzzy set, while the consequent of a Sugeno rule 
is a function.  
 
3.3.5. Interval Type-2 Fuzzy Modeling 
 
In the type-2 fuzzy system, as illustrated in Figure 24, there is a step called type-
reducer before the final defuzzification. The final results of type-2 fuzzy membership 
function need to be reduced to type-1 fuzzy membership function, then defuzzified to a 
crisp value. 
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Figure 24. The structure of type-2 fuzzy logic system. 
 
 
 
Step1: Fuzzification of input and output variables. (If Sugeno fuzzy inference is 
used, only fuzzification of input variables is needed. The output variables are then 
determined by a function of input variables.) Select relevant input and output variables as 
well as the universe of discourses for each variable. Then, determine the number of 
linguistic terms for each input and output variables and establish fuzzy membership 
functions. 
Step 2: Fuzzy inference system. Choose a specific type of fuzzy inference system. 
Design a list of fuzzy if-then rules based on available knowledge and data (common sense, 
knowledge from experts, and physical laws).  
The following shows an example of a Sugeno rulebase of an Interval type-2 fuzzy 
set consisting of N rules assuming the following forms: 
Rn: IF x1 is ?̃?1
𝑛 and … and xI is ?̃?𝐼
𝑛, THEN y is Yn    n = 1, 2, … N 
 Rn: nth rule 
 ?̃?𝑖
𝑛: interval type-2 fuzzy set 
 𝑌: Y = [𝑦𝑛, 𝑦
𝑛
] is an interval. For each rule, the consequent is an interval.  
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Assume the input vector is 𝑥′ = (𝑥1
′ , 𝑥2
′ , … , 𝑥𝐼
′). Then the firing interval of the nth 
rule, 𝐹𝑛(𝑥′), can be calculated through the following function: 
Eq. (3-26)  
𝐹𝑛(𝑥′) = [𝜇𝑋1𝑛(𝑥1
′ ) × … × 𝜇𝑋𝐼𝑛(𝑥𝐼
′), 𝜇
𝑋1
𝑛(𝑥1
′ ) × … × 𝜇
𝑋𝐼
𝑛(𝑥𝐼
′)] ≡ [𝑓𝑛, 𝑓
𝑛
] 
 ?̃?𝑖
𝑛 =  [𝜇𝑋𝑖
𝑛(𝑥𝑖
′), 𝜇
𝑋𝑖
𝑛(𝑥𝑖
′)]: the membership function 𝑥𝑖
′ 
 
Step 3: Type-reducer and defuzzification of the resultant fuzzy membership 
function. Type-reduction then is performed to combine 𝐹𝑛(𝑥′) and the corresponding rule 
consequents. There are different methods, and the most widely used method is the center-
of-sets type-reducer [47]: 
Eq. (3-27) 𝑌𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑥
′) =  ⋃
∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑦𝑛𝑁𝑛=1
∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑁𝑛=1
𝑓𝑛𝜖 𝐹𝑛(𝑥′)
𝑦𝑛𝜖𝑌𝑛
= [𝑦𝑙 , 𝑦𝑟] 
  
KM algorithm [48] can be used to calculate 𝑦𝑙 and 𝑦𝑟. The defuzzified output can 
be calculated through the following equation: 
Eq. (3-28) 𝑦 =  
𝑦𝑙+𝑦𝑟
2
 
 
Step 4: Optimization of the whole system.  Through the interview with human 
experts who are familiar with the target systems and more studies, parameters of 
membership functions (MFs) can be further modified and more rules can be incorporated 
into the system. 
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4. A PROBABILISTIC AND FUZZY LOGIC HYBRID APPROACH * 
 
This section describes a fuzzy logic and probabilistic hybrid approach that was 
developed to determine the mean value and to quantify the uncertainty of frequency of an 
initiating event and the probabilities of failure on demand (PFD) of independent protection 
layers (IPLs). It is based on the available data and expert judgment. The method was 
applied to a distillation system with a capacity to distill 40 tons of flammable n-hexane.  
 
4.1. Uncertainty Sources in Failure Rate 
 
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) provides a simplified and less precise method 
to assess the effectiveness of protection layers and the residual risk of an incident scenario. 
The outcome failure frequency and consequence of that residual risk are intended to be 
conservative. This makes the risk in a conservative approach usually overestimated. 
The failure rate consists of the frequency of an initiating event and the probabilities 
of failure on demand (PFD) of independent protection layers (IPLs). They are related with 
the frequency part of the risk. Two aspects are investigated in this part. First aspect is the 
sources of uncertainty in failure rate. Second aspect is the representation of uncertainty in 
failure rate data. 
                                                 
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “A fuzzy logic and probabilistic hybrid approach to 
quantify the uncertainty in layer of protection analysis” by Yizhi Hong, Hans J. Pasman, Sonny Sachdeva, 
Adam S. Markowski, and M. Sam Mannan, 2016. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 43, 
Copyright 2016 by Elsevier. 
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Uncertainty exists in the failure rate data. Generally speaking, if there are more 
data in the database, and all the data are scientifically collected and analyzed, the data will 
be more accurate, i.e., there is less uncertainty in the database. Moreover, the sources of 
the data can also affect the amount of uncertainty. There are two types of database, 
including generic database and plant-specific database. Table 7 shows the definition, 
advantages and disadvantages of generic database and plant-specific data. Typical generic 
databases are available at the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) [49] and the 
Offshore Reliability Data Handbook (OREDA) [50]. Compared to generate database, 
plant-specific data are first-hand data, and it can better reflect the actual situations of the 
process and equipment. The ideal method to eliminate uncertainty is collecting enough 
plant-specific data. However, an extensive data collection system for a plant is much time 
and money consuming and in practice not realizable. Generic databases, which provide a 
much larger pool of data, are less specific and have less detail. The environmental 
conditions and operating conditions, the maintenance policy, and the definition and 
boundary of the investigating instruments can be different from those of the instruments 
in the generic databases. In these situations, using generic databases could increase the 
uncertainty. Moreover, expert knowledge is used in some situations when no data are 
available.  
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Table 7. Comparison of generic databases and plant-specific failure data. 
 Generic databases  plant-specific failure data 
Def. Data from a variety of plants and 
industries 
Failure data from the on-site plant 
Pros Provide a much larger pool of data Reflect the plant's process, environment, 
maintenance practices, and operation of 
equipment 
Cons Less specific and detailed Data collection is very difficult, and an 
extensive data collection system is 
expensive 
 
 
 
In conventional LOPA, single point values or the upper bounds of intervals of 
failure rates are derived from historical data or literature, and there is no uncertainty 
information in a point value. The expression of the data in this way does not take the 
uncertainty into account. 
 
4.2. Relevant Literature Review and Gap Identification 
 
Markowski and Mannan [10] developed a fuzzy LOPA (fLOPA) approach for risk 
assessment of transportation of flammable substances in long pipelines. The risk value 
calculated by fLOPA shows a more accurate result than those given by conventional 
LOPA. Khalil et al. [51] developed a cascaded-fuzzy LOPA risk assessment model with 
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an application in the natural gas industry. Ouazraoui et al. [5]  used fuzzy quantities to 
represent the data provided from reliability databases and expert judgments in LOPA. 
Although the result is a parameter value, no uncertainty information is preserved, which 
is considered a drawback of the method.  
Freeman used observed data distributions on component failure where they are 
available (e.g., a pressure relief valve). However, these are scarce. He also extended an 
available single data point of a component failure probability to a simple triangular 
distribution by simply adding a lower and upper limit, which are based on site operator 
experience [52, 53]. Given a triangular distribution, the mean value and variance can be 
calculated. As is known, variance is an indication of uncertainty. The convolution of 
different failure rate data is through the application of variance contribution analysis 
(VCA) and a simplified numerical approximation. The final frequency is also a 
distribution with uncertainty information.  
Pasman and Rogers [54] applied Bayesian network in LOPA. The Bayesian 
network (BN) approach is based on existing data and knowledge including uncertainty. 
Distributions were developed based on data and expert knowledge to represent the failure 
rate. The final risk result is a distribution with uncertainty information. By the inference 
and diagnosis options BN improves understanding of complex systems. 
As shown in Table 7, there are benefits and drawbacks in using generic database 
and plant-specific data solely. The basic elements of a good database include the source 
of data, failure mode, confidence and tolerance of the data, equipment definition and 
boundary diagrams, process severity, environment, maintenance, etc. [49] Considering 
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these aspects of data, the aggregation is not a simple process, thus expert knowledge and 
judgment is required. An expert needs to first assess the quality and relevance of a 
database, and then perform an aggregation process based on an investigation of the basic 
elements of the database.  
Through fuzzy logic, expert knowledge can easily be incorporated in a LOPA 
model to reduce uncertainty. However, due to the defuzzification step in fuzzy logic 
modeling, only a crisp value can be obtained in the final result. This means that the fuzzy 
results are more accurate values of the mean but all the uncertainty information is lost in 
the modeling process. 
Both of the distributions in Freeman’s model and Pasman and Rogers’s model are 
the combination of data and expert knowledge. Freeman used VCA for the failure rates 
aggregation, and Pasman and Rogers used Monte Carlo and dynamic discretization 
methods. The results of both methods are distributions, which maintain all the uncertainty 
information. However, experts can express their knowledge easier in linguistic terms on 
an ordinal scale which can be directly translated to fuzzy membership functions, an 
advantage of the fuzzy logic approach. 
In this section, a fuzzy logic and probabilistic hybrid approach is developed to 
efficiently aggregate generic database and plant-specific data using expert judgment, and 
taking account of both uncertainties in the data and expert knowledge. The hybrid 
approach not only determines the mean value of failure rate, but also quantifies the 
uncertainty. This approach takes advantage of all available information, including generic 
databases, plant-specific data, and expert experience. Each frequency or probability is 
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expressed in a distribution. The final frequency, which is the multiplication of the 
frequency of the initiating event and all the PFD of IPLs, is accomplished by the Monte 
Carlo simulation.  
 
4.3. Present Hybrid Approach 
 
The structure of the fuzzy logic and probabilistic hybrid approach is illustrated in 
Figure 25. First, a distribution is generated from the generic database and available plant-
specific data. For the distribution, different types of functions can be used. In this research, 
the log-normal distribution is used for its wide application in reliability and failure rate 
data due to its merits of non-negative values and a long tail. The probability density 
function for log-normal distribution is described in Eq. (4-1,2,3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Structure of fuzzy logic and probabilistic hybrid approach. 
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Eq. (4-1) 𝑓(𝑥 | 𝑚, 𝑣) =
1
𝜎√2𝜋
exp [−
(𝑙𝑛𝑥−𝑢)2
2𝜎2
] 
Eq. (4-2) 𝑚 = exp (𝑢 +
𝜎2
2
) 
Eq. (4-3) 𝑣 = exp (2𝑢 + 𝜎2)(exp(𝜎2) − 1) 
 µ: the mean of the variable’s normal logarithm 
 σ: the standard deviation of the variable’s normal logarithm 
 m: the mean of the lognormal distribution 
 v: the variance of the lognormal distribution 
 
Here, 𝑚 and 𝑣 will be obtained by fitting a distribution function to the collected 
sets of data. Depending on the quantity and differences between data sets and between 
data proper of a set, different methods can be followed. A distribution can be fitted to each 
set and the distributions of the sets convoluted. One can also put all data together and fit a 
distribution to the whole collection. The data sets have different quality and background, 
so one could consider to give the most reliable ones a weighting factor (>1). The spread, 
as expressed in the standard deviation of a distribution, is only part of the uncertainty. Best 
way to proceed would be to have experts give their opinion about the reliability of the data 
and to include that in the uncertainty expressed in the standard deviation, while retaining 
the mean. By presenting a set of fixed qualifiers, experts can select from a correction on 
the 𝑣-value. This appears to be a simpler approach for expert elicitation than weighting 
factors for which no reference is available. Losing the uncertainty information on the 
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variance by deriving the crisp value is only a second order effect compared to the same on 
the mean.  
To achieve the objective sketched above by means of fuzzy logic, a parameter 
variance modifier (PVM) is developed to further modify the distribution based on four 
factors: database quality, database relevance, quantity of plant-specific data, and 
experience level of expert. Database quality is to assess whether the database is established 
based on a scientific approach, and whether the data is scientifically collected and 
statistically analyzed. Database relevance is about whether the environmental condition 
and operation condition of the instrument for the database is close to those in the target 
facility. The larger quantity of plant-specific data indicates a more accurate distribution. 
The uncertainty of expert judgment is assessed based on the experience level of expert. 
The modeling structure of PVM is illustrated in Figure 26. It means that database quality 
and database relevance determine the parameter database applicability; while the latter 
together with the quantity of plant-specific data determine the data confidence. Finally, 
data confidence and experience level of expert determine the PVM.  Type-1 fuzzy logic 
modeling is used in each step. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 26. Fuzzy modeling of parameter variance modifier (PVM). 
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PVM is a value between 0 and 1. For a distribution modified by PVM, its mean 
value    remains the same, while its variance is modified by Eq. (4-4): 
 
Eq. (4-4) 𝑣∗ =
𝑣
√𝑃𝑉𝑀
                  
 v: the variance for the first derived log-normal distribution. 
 v*: the variance for the modified distribution 
 
Because PVM is a value within [0, 1], v* will be a number larger than v, or equal 
to it if all factors are assessed as highest.  Thus, a smaller PVM value indicates that a larger 
uncertainty is remaining in the aggregation process of generic database and plant-specific 
data. The square root is chosen to make the effect of the PVM non-proportional, hence 
relatively less to weaken the influence at very low PVN values. 
According to the fuzzy modeling process shown in Figure 17, the first step is 
fuzzification of all the inputs and output. Table 8 illustrates the universal discourse and 
description of each linguistic variable. The membership functions of all parameters were 
established and the final PVM values generated with the help of the Matlab Fuzzy 
Toolbox, as shown in Figure 27-33. The Quantity of plant-specific data is evaluated based 
on the available number[55], and experience level is evaluated based on the working time 
(year) of the expert. All other input parameters are also scaled from 0 to 1, while 0 means 
limited and 1 means good.  
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Table 8. Fuzzy linguistic variables description. 
Linguistic variables Universe of 
discourse 
Descriptive linguistic terms 
Parameter variance 
modifier 
(0, 1) {Marginal, Adequate, Good, 
Excellent} 
Database quality (0, 1) {Bad, Low, Medium, High} 
Database relevance (0, 1) {Irrelevant, Marginal, Applicable, 
Same} 
Database applicability (0, 1) {Doubtful, Possible, Practical, 
Wide} 
Quantity of plant-specific 
data 
(0, 30) data points {Few data, Limited, Proper, 
Sufficient} 
Data confidence (0, 1) {Bad, Average, Good, Superior} 
Experience level of 
expert 
(0, 10) year {Beginner, Intermediate, Senior, 
Advanced} 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Parameter Variance Modifier (PVM) membership function. 
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Figure 28. Database quality membership function. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Database relevance membership function. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Database applicability membership function. 
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Figure 31. Quantity of plant-specific data membership function. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Data confidence membership function. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33. Experience level of expert (year of working experience). 
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Fuzzy rules are introduced according to the engineering and expert knowledge. 
Mamdani fuzzy inference is used for the fuzzy modeling. In order to keep the rules simple, 
only two antecedents (inputs) are used each time. Table 9 shows the fuzzy if-then rules of 
data relevance and database quality in determining database applicability, while Figure 34 
shows the Matlab user interface for these fuzzy rules. Table 10 shows the fuzzy if-then 
rules of database applicability and quantity of plant-specific data in determining data 
confidence, while Figure 35 shows the Matlab user interface for these fuzzy rules. Table 
11 shows the fuzzy if-then rules of data confidence and experience level of expert in 
determining PVM, while Figure 36 shows the Matlab user interface for these fuzzy rules. 
The following examples of rules from Table 9 are presented below: 
 
Rule 1: IF “Database quality” = bad AND “Database relevance” = irrelevant, THEN 
“Database applicability”= Doubtful. 
Rule 2:  IF “Database quality” = high AND “Database relevance” = marginal, THEN 
“Database applicability”= Practical. 
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Table 9. Fuzzy IF-Then rules of data relevance and database quality. 
Database applicability 
rules 
Database quality 
1 2 3 4 
Database relevance Bad Low Medium High 
1 Irrelevant Doubtful Doubtful Possible Possible 
2 Marginal Doubtful Possible Possible Practical 
3 Applicable Possible Possible Practical Wide 
4 Same Possible Practical Wide Wide 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Fuzzy IF-Then rules of data relevance and database quality. 
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Table 10. Fuzzy IF-Then rules of Data confidence. 
Data confidence rules Database applicability 
1 2 3 4 
Quantity of plant-
specific data  
Doubtful Possible Practical Wide 
1 Few data Bad Bad  Average  Good 
2 Limited Bad Average  Good Good 
3 Proper Average Good Superior Superior 
4 Sufficient Superior Superior Superior Superior 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35. Fuzzy IF-Then rules of Data confidence. 
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Table 11. Fuzzy IF-Then rules of PVM. 
PVM rules Experience level of expert 
1 2 3 4 
Data confidence Beginner Intermediate Senior Advanced 
1 Bad Marginal Marginal Adequate Good 
2 Average Adequate Adequate Good  Excellent 
3 Good Good Excellent Excellent Excellent 
4 Superior Excellent Excellent Excellent Excellent 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Fuzzy IF-Then rules of PVM. 
 
 
 
A modified centroid approach (COA) is used for all three fuzzy models. The 
purpose is to make sure the maximum result of PVM is 1. The modified defuzzification 
process of the resulting PVM can be found in the following equation: 
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Eq. (4-4) 𝐶𝑂𝐴 =
∫ 𝑥µ𝐶(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
0.9 ∫ µ𝐶(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
 
 µ𝐶(𝑥): the resultant membership function of the output. 
 
All the frequency of an initiating event and the PFD of IPLs are presented in 
distributions. The multiplication of frequency and failure rate distributions is achieved by 
a Monte Carlo algorithm. 
 The final results of the fuzzy logic modeling can be viewed through the rule-based 
graphics or a three-dimensional fuzzy surface. Figure 37 shows the final fuzzy surface of 
database applicability determined by database quality and database relevance. Figure 38 
shows the final fuzzy surface of data confidence determined by quantity of plant-specific 
data and database applicability. Figure 39 shows the final fuzzy surface of PVM 
determined by data confidence and experience level of expert.  
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Figure 37. The resultant fuzzy surface of data applicability. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38. The resultant fuzzy surface of data confidence. 
 
 69 
 
 
Figure 39. The resultant fuzzy surface of PVM. 
 
 
 
4.4. Case Study 
 
Table 12 shows some result samples of PVM modeling. In scenario 1, the database is 
in very high quality (database quality=1), it is from a related industry (database relevance 
= 0.7), there are 15 plant-specific data points, and it is assessed by a 5-year working 
experience expert, the PVM equals 0.99. This means the data aggregation process leads to 
an accurate distribution. In scenario 2, there is no plant-specific data, and a 5-year 
experience expert assesses the data only based a sound database (database quality = 1, 
database relevance =0.7). The PVM equals 0.65, which means the distribution developed 
by the expert is between average and good.  
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Table 12. Some result samples of PVM fuzzy modeling. 
 Inputs Output 
Scenario Database 
quality (0-
1) 
Database 
relevance (0-
1) 
Plant 
specific data 
(0-30 data) 
Experience 
level of expert 
(0-10yr) 
PVM (0-1) 
1 1 0.7 15 5 0.99 
2 1 0.7 0 5 0.65 
3 1 0.7 6 10 1 
4 1 1 0 10 0.97 
5 0.8 0.6 2 5 0.80 
 
 
A simplified distillation system [36] is used as a case study. As presented in Figure 
40, the distillation system consists of four main units: the distillation column, reboiler 
system, condenser, cooling water tower, and distillate receiver system. The column has a 
diameter of about 2 meters, height of 15 meters, and the total contained mass of flammable 
n-hexane is about 40 tons (boiling point, BP = 69C, flash point FP = -23C). The working 
environment is at 120 C and 0.39 MPa.  
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Figure 40. A simplified distillation column system [36]. 
 
 
 
The basic safety assurance principle is to keep energy balance in the column 
between reboiler and condenser. The distillation system was evaluated in a hazard and 
operability (HAZOP) study and the following initiating causes were identified: 
A. Loss of cooling tower water supply to the condenser 
B. Failure of the distillate pump 
C. Failure of the level loop control in the distillate tank (LIC) to high level 
D. Distillate manual valve left closed after shut-down 
E. Failure of the steam flow control (FIC) to high steam flow. 
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In this section, one cause-consequence pair (the loss of cooling water causing a 
release of a flammable cloud into the plant through a relief valve) is used as an example 
to illustrate the application of the hybrid approach. 
 
 
 
Table 13. Frequency and probability of failure on demand (PFD) data. 
Frequency [1/year] PFD for each IPL Frequency 
Initiating event 
(IE) 
Operator 
intervention (OP) 
Safety instrumented 
system (SIS) 
LOPA final 
frequency for a 
scenario /yr 
Loss of cooling 10-1 10-1 Safety integrity 
level (SIL) 2     
10-4 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 13, the frequency of loss of cooling water as an initiating event 
is 1 in 10 years, or 10-1 /year. The first IPL is high temperature and pressure alarms 
displayed on the distributed control system to alert the operator to shut off the valve. The 
PFD of an operator to respond to a high temperature alarm within half of the maximum 
allowed time of 10 minutes is 1 failure in 10 demands, or 10-1 [28]. The second IPL is a 
SIL 2 valve which will stop feeding fuel to the reboiler. The PFD for a SIL 2 instrument 
is [10-3, 10-2], and 10-2 will be used by traditional LOPA in order to be conservative.  As 
a result, the final frequency calculated by the traditional CCPS LOPA is 10-4 based on the 
equation (1).  
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The final results of the hybrid approach and traditional LOPA approach are shown 
in Table 14. The log-normal distributions for the initiating event and each IPL were 
developed considering generic databases, plant-specific data and expert experience. The 
PVM values were calculated separately based on the assessment of four factors, i.e., 
database quality, database relevance, quantity of plant-specific data, and experience level 
of expert. The PVM values of 1, 0.80 and 0.65 of scenario 3, 5 and 2, respectively in Table 
12 were used to illustrate the hybrid method. However, in the real situation, the PVM 
values for the initiating event and each IPL will be calculated separately.   
Monte Carlo method was used for the distribution convolution. 10,000 numbers 
were randomly generated from each log-normal distribution. All the result values of the 
multiplication of the frequency of initiating event and the failure rates of each IPL were 
then presented in a histogram, as shown in Figure 41. The mean and 95 percentile values 
were calculated and recorded. It is concluded that a low PVM, indicating bad data and/or 
inexperienced knowledge, increases the standard deviation of the distributions 
dramatically. A risk analyst can make risk decisions based on both the mean value and the 
variance. For example, if the difference between the mean value and the 95 percentile 
value is greater than one order of magnitude, additional IPL can be applied to reduce the 
failure frequency of the specific scenario. In this case study, the difference between the 
mean and 95 percentile are less than one order of magnitude for all three scenarios.  
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Table 14. Log-normal distributions of frequency and probability expressed as 𝑓(𝑚, √𝑣). 
IE or IPL Probability density 
function (PDF) 
Modified PDF 
with PVM =1 
Modified PDF 
with PVM =0.80 
Modified PDF 
with PVM =0.65 
Traditional 
LOPA 
IE (/yr) ƒ(10-1, 10-1) ƒ(10-1, 10-1) ƒ(10-1, 1.24×10-1) ƒ(10-1, 1.54×10-1) 10-1 
OP ƒ(10-1, 10-1) ƒ(10-1, 10-1) ƒ(10-1, 1.24×10-1) ƒ(10-1, 1.54×10-1) 10-1 
SIS ƒ(5×10-3, 2×10-3) ƒ(5×10-3, 2×10-3) ƒ(5×10-3, 2.5×10-3) ƒ(5×10-3, 3.1×10-3) 10-2 
Final mean 5×10-5 5×10-5 5×10-5 5×10-5 10-4 
95 percentiles 1.78×10-4 1.78×10-4 1.86×10-4 1.99×10-4  
Note: 𝑓(𝑚, √𝑣) is a lognormal probability density function, where m is the mean, v is the variance. 
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Figure 41. Final failure rates in histograms for three scenarios with parameter variance 
modifier (PVM) equals 1, 0.8, 0.65 respectively. 
 
 
 
 76 
 
4.5. Conclusions 
 
The hybrid approach adapts the advantages of both the probabilistic and fuzzy 
logic approaches. The failure rate is expressed as a distribution through the probabilistic 
approach, and expert knowledge is easily modeled in terms of fuzzy linguistic terms. The 
first benefit of the hybrid approach is that a more accurate failure rate can be achieved 
with the available data and expert judgment. The comparison shows that the convolution 
of distributions provides a lower value of scenario frequency than traditional LOPA. That 
is because in traditional LOPA data are selected conservatively. Moreover, uncertainty is 
quantified in terms of the distribution variance. Compared to a crisp value in traditional 
LOPA, a risk analyst can make a risk decision with more confidence. A new database 
reflecting a plant's processes, environments, maintenance practices, and equipment 
operation can be developed through this hybrid approach to facilitate a more accurate layer 
of protection analysis. 
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5. UNIVERSAL RISK MATRIX 
 
In this section, an approach is proposed to aggregate a number of risk matrices into 
one universal risk matrix based on the weights. Interval type-2 fuzzy logic is adopted for 
the aggregation as well as to quantify the uncertainty. An example of a fuzzy universal 
risk matrix by aggregating three risk matrices is used to illustrate this method. 
 
5.1. Uncertainty Sources in Risk Matrix 
 
Risk matrices are widely used in the qualitative and semi-quantitative risk 
assessment and risk management. There are different types of risk matrix formats 
according to the function and risk acceptance criteria of the organization. Sometimes a 
universal or corporate-wide risk matrix format is developed in attempt to standardize risk 
management across the company. 
Risk is interpreted as a measure of the severity and probability of occurrence of an 
event that causes consequences, such as human injury, environmental damage, or 
economic loss. As described in section 2.1, risk is defined as a function of consequence 
and frequency. Cox [33], and Levine [34] calculate risk as the multiplication of probability 
and consequence. However, in a risk matrix, the risk is defined as a mapping of categories 
of consequence and frequency to category of risk. The mapping is based on subject-matter 
experts (SME) and industrial standards.  
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 A risk matrix uses discrete categories of risk, consequence, and frequency. It is a 
semi-quantitative way to represent risk, i.e., there are uncertainty in the risk statement 
[36]. One disadvantage of a risk matrix is that it provides limited resolution of risk due to 
that fact that the risk is described in discrete categories. Limited resolution may lead to 
many combinations of frequency and consequence leading to the same risk category, thus 
the risk from different scenarios could not be prioritized.   
In a risk matrix, the risk is defined as a mapping of categories of consequence and 
frequency to category of risk. The mapping is based on subject-matter experts (SME) and 
industrial standards. Some subjective bias can be encountered when a group of experts are 
doing risk assessment using the risk matrix [36]. Markowski [11] states that “the overall 
risk category (risk score) obtained in a traditional approach by categorization of frequency 
and severity of the consequence is quite imprecise and vague which produces the 
significant uncertainties concerning the risk category”.  
 In some situations, different risk matrices need to be combined to develop a new 
and universal risk matrix. Due to the fact that the development of each risk matrix involves 
interpretation, there are intra-personal and inter-personal uncertainties in the process. 
Intra-personal uncertainty refers to the uncertainty with which a person interprets a 
concept. Inter-personal uncertainty means the different understanding to a same concept 
of various people. 
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5.2. Literature Review and Gap Identification 
 
Markowski and Mannan  developed a fuzzy risk matrix using type-1 fuzzy logic 
modeling [11]. The first step is the fuzzification of frequency, consequence, and risk. Then 
all the information in the risk matrix is used as fuzzy rules for a Mamdani fuzzy inference 
system. Three risk matrices (low cost, standard and high cost) are transferred into three 
fuzzy risk matrices. Figure 42 shows the traditional risk matrix and its fuzzy risk matrix. 
This method has been applied to a case study, and the results show that the final risk as 
indicated at a fuzzy risk matrix is more reliable and precise. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42. Standard risk matrix and its fuzzy risk matrix [11]. 
 
 
 
As described in Section 5.1, there are certain limitations of a traditional risk matrix, 
including poor resolutions, ambiguous input and output, etc. The new method focuses on 
increasing the precision of a risk matrix by quantifying the uncertainty. Interval type-2 
 80 
 
fuzzy logic is used for the development of fuzzy risk matrix. The fuzzy risk developed by 
Markowski and Mannan is based on type-1 fuzzy logic modeling [11]. Type-1 fuzzy sets 
can be treated as a first-order approximation to the uncertainty in the real life, and type-2 
fuzzy sets is a second-order approximation. Thus type-2 fuzzy logic works better in 
analyzing intra-personal and inter-personal uncertainties. 
The development of a single risk matrix involves expert interpretation. There are 
more intra-personal and inter-personal uncertainties when a group of experts are 
aggregating several risk matrices into a single universal risk matrix. The new method 
provides an efficient way to aggregate several risk matrices and quantify the uncertainty. 
The final fuzzy risk matrix is in high resolution.  
 
5.3. Relevant Methods 
 
Two relevant methods, interval approach and linguistic weighted average, are 
introduced here. The interval approach (IA) is used to convert survey data into fuzzy sets. 
The linguistic weighted average is a unique type of weighted average with its sub-criteria 
or weight modeled as an interval type-2 fuzzy set. 
 
5.3.1. Interval Approach (IA) 
 
The interval approach (IA) is used to develop a type-2 fuzzy set for a linguistic 
term from a survey to experts [56]. It consists of two parts: collect data from experts and 
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develop interval type-2 fuzzy sets, as shown in Figure 43. In the data collection part, for 
each linguistic term, a group of n Subject Matter Experts will be asked the following 
question: 
Use an interval to describe a term: on a scale of __, what are the endpoints of the 
interval that you think best describe the word__? 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43. The flow diagram of Interval Approach. 
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 For example, assume there are 8 linguistic terms for frequency, including 
Remote (A), Unlikely (B), Very Low (C), Low (D), Medium (E), High (F), very High 
(G). The scale of frequency is [10-8, 1]. If we want to get the data for the High (F) 
frequency, the following questions will be asked to n experts: 
On a scale of [10-8, 1], what are the endpoints of the interval that you think best 
describe the words High frequency (F)? 
 
Experts can also draw the interval from a scale that they think best fit the linguistic 
term. Figure 44 shows an example of data interval in the scale of the frequency. It is 
absolutely acceptable that there are overlaps between the intervals of different linguistic 
terms. Table 15 shows the results of the survey from 4 experts. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44. The scale of frequency and an example of data interval. 
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Table 15. The evaluation results for Risk Matrix I – Frequency B from 4 experts. 
Expert Range, in Log10( . ) 
1 -3.0 -1.0 
2 -2.5 -1.0 
3 -2.5 -1.5 
4 -3.0 -1.5 
 
 
 
After the survey, for each linguistic term, there will be n data intervals [𝑎(𝑖), 𝑏(𝑖)]. 
These data will go through four processes to get m data intervals [𝑎(𝑖), 𝑏(𝑖)] to get rid of 
some outliers and bad data. Finally, a uniform distribution is assigned to each of the 
remaining m intervals  [𝑎(𝑖), 𝑏(𝑖)] . Its mean and standard deviation are computed as 
follows: 
Eq. (3-46) 𝑚(𝑖) =
𝑎(𝑖)+𝑏(𝑖)
2
 
Eq. (3-47) 𝜎(𝑖) =
𝑏(𝑖)−𝑎(𝑖)
√12
 
 
The next step is to map each qualified data interval into a type-1 fuzzy set. Table 
16 shows the transformation equations of the uniform distribution of data interval into a 
type-1 fuzzy set. There are three types of membership function, i.e., left-shoulder 
membership function, right shoulder membership function, and symmetric triangle 
membership function. The smallest linguistic term is transformed into left shoulder 
membership function, the largest linguistic term is transformed into right shoulder 
membership function, and all the other linguistic terms is transformed into symmetric 
triangle membership function. In the frequency example, Remote (A) is described in a left 
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shoulder membership function, very High (G) is described in a right shoulder membership 
function, and the rest are described in symmetric triangle membership function. The logic 
is that mean and variance of the uniform distribution of data interval are the same with 
those of the type-1 fuzzy membership function.  
 
 
 
Table 16. Transformation equations of the uniform distribution of data interval into the 
type-1 fuzzy set [56]. 
Membership function 𝒎𝑴𝑭 and 𝝈𝑴𝑭 Transformation 
Symmetric triangle 
(Interior MF) 
 
 
𝑚𝑀𝐹 =
𝑎𝑀𝐹+𝑏𝑀𝐹
2
  
𝜎𝑀𝐹 =
𝑏𝑀𝐹−𝑎𝑀𝐹
2√6
  
 
 
𝑎𝑀𝐹 =  
𝑎+𝑏
2
− 
𝑏−𝑎
√2
  
𝑏𝑀𝐹 =  
𝑎+𝑏
2
+ 
𝑏−𝑎
√2
  
Left shoulder 
 
 
 
𝑚𝑀𝐹 =
2𝑎𝑀𝐹+𝑏𝑀𝐹
3
  
𝜎𝑀𝐹 =
𝑏𝑀𝐹−𝑎𝑀𝐹
3√2
  
 
 
𝑎𝑀𝐹 =  
𝑎+𝑏
2
− 
𝑏−𝑎
√6
  
𝑏𝑀𝐹 =  
𝑎+𝑏
2
+ 
√6(𝑏−𝑎)
3
  
Right shoulder 
 
 
 
𝑚𝑀𝐹 =
𝑎𝑀𝐹+2𝑏𝑀𝐹
3
  
𝜎𝑀𝐹 =
𝑏𝑀𝐹−𝑎𝑀𝐹
3√2
  
 
 
𝑎𝑀𝐹 =  
𝑎+𝑏
2
− 
√6(𝑏−𝑎)
3
  
𝑏𝑀𝐹 =  
𝑎+𝑏
2
+ 
𝑏−𝑎
√6
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The last step is to compute an interval type-2 fuzzy set using union operation of all 
the type-1 fuzzy sets obtained in the previous step. The resultant interval type-2 fuzzy set 
will cover all the type-1 fuzzy sets. As an example, Figure 45 shows the final resultant 
interval type-2 fuzzy set for High Frequency (F) as a union of all the type-1 fuzzy sets 
obtained from 4 experts.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 45. The resultant interval type-2 fuzzy set of Risk Matrix I – Frequency B. 
 
 
 
5.3.2. Linguistic Weighted Average (LWA) 
 
The weighted average is the most widely used form of aggregation. The most well-
known formula for weighted average is the following function: 
Eq. (5-1) 𝑦 =
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 wi : the weights;  
 xi : the sub-criteria. 
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In many situations, the crisp numbers for either the sub-criteria or the weights is 
not enough to describe complex problem. It is important that the sub-criteria and weights 
are intervals, type-1 fuzzy sets, and type-2 fuzzy sets.  
Fuzzy weighted average (FWA) is a type of weighted average when at least one 
sub-criteria or weight is modeled as type-1 fuzzy set [57]. Fuzzy weighted average can be 
described through the following equation: 
Eq. (5-2) 𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴 ≡
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 𝑋𝑖: the sub-criteria. It is a type-1 fuzzy set. 
 𝑊𝑖: the weights. It is a type-1 fuzzy set. 
 𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴: the results of fuzzy weighted average. It is a type-1 fuzzy set. 
 
α-cut is used to compute the FWA. All the fuzzy sets of sub-criteria, X, and 
weights, W, are discretized into m α-cuts, α1, α2, …, αm. According to the definition of α-
cut given in Section 3.2.3, the corresponding intervals for xi in Xi and wi in Wi are found 
for each αj are described in Eq. (5-3) and Eq. (5-4). 
Eq. (5-3) 𝑥𝑖𝜖[𝑎𝑖(𝛼𝑗), 𝑏𝑖(𝛼𝑗)] 
Eq. (5-4) 𝑤𝑖𝜖[𝑐𝑖(𝛼𝑗), 𝑑(𝛼𝑗)] 
For a particular α-cut, αj, the outcome of the FWA algorithm, 𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴(𝛼𝑗), can be 
described through Eq. (5-5,6,7). 
Eq. (5-5) 𝑌𝐹𝑊𝐴(𝛼𝑗) =
∑ 𝑋𝑖(𝛼𝑗)𝑊𝑖(𝛼𝑗)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑊𝑖(𝛼𝑗)
𝑛
𝑖=1
= [𝑓𝐿(𝛼𝑗),  𝑓𝑅(𝛼𝑗)] 
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Eq. (5-6) 𝑓𝐿(𝛼𝑗) = min
∀𝑤𝑖𝜖[𝑐𝑖(𝛼𝑗),𝑑(𝛼𝑗)]
∑ 𝑋𝑖(𝛼𝑗)𝑊𝑖(𝛼𝑗)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑊𝑖(𝛼𝑗)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Eq. (5-7) 𝑓𝑅(𝛼𝑗) = max
∀𝑤𝑖𝜖[𝑐𝑖(𝛼𝑗),𝑑(𝛼𝑗)]
∑ 𝑋𝑖(𝛼𝑗)𝑊𝑖(𝛼𝑗)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑊𝑖(𝛼𝑗)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
KM Algorithm [48] can be used to calculate 𝑓𝐿(𝛼𝑗) and 𝑓𝑅(𝛼𝑗). When the intervals 
[𝑓𝐿(𝛼𝑗),  𝑓𝑅(𝛼𝑗)] of all m α-cuts are found, the membership function of 𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴, 𝜇𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴(𝑦), 
is computed as: 
Eq. (5-8) 𝜇𝑌𝐹𝑊𝐴(𝑦) =  sup
∀𝛼𝑗
𝛼𝑗𝐼𝐹𝐿𝑊𝐴 (𝑦) 
 𝐼𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴 (𝑦): the indicator function of 𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴(𝛼𝑗), see Eq. (3-16) 
 
Linguistic weighted average is a type of weighted average when at least one sub-
criteria or weight is modeled as an interval type-2 fuzzy set [38]. Linguistic weighted 
average can be described through the following equation: 
Eq. (5-9) ?̃?𝐿𝑊𝐴 =
∑ ?̃?𝑖?̃?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 ?̃?𝑖: the sub-criteria. It is an interval type-2 fuzzy set. 
 ?̃?𝑖: the weights. It is an interval type-2 fuzzy set. 
 ?̃?𝐿𝑊𝐴: the results of linguistic weighted average. It is an interval type-2 
fuzzy set. 
 
According to the definition of interval type-2 fuzzy set, all the interval type-2 fuzzy 
set can be defined by its FOU. The following three equations are the representation of 
?̃?𝐿𝑊𝐴, ?̃?𝑖 and ?̃?𝑖 though their FOUs. 
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Eq. (5-10) ?̃?𝐿𝑊𝐴 = 1/𝐹𝑂𝑈(?̃?𝐿𝑊𝐴) ≡ 1/[𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴, 𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴] 
Eq. (5-11) ?̃?𝑖 = 1/𝐹𝑂𝑈(?̃?𝑖) = 1/ [𝑋𝑖, 𝑋𝑖] = 1/ ⋃ 𝐴𝑒𝑖
𝑗𝑖𝑛𝑋𝑖
𝑗𝑖=1
 
Eq. (5-12) ?̃?𝑖 = 1/𝐹𝑂𝑈(?̃?𝑖) = 1/ [𝑊𝑖, 𝑊𝑖] = 1/ ⋃ 𝑊𝑒𝑖
𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑊𝑖
𝑘𝑖=1
 
  
Then the lower membership function,  𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴 , and upper membership function, 
𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴, can be calculated through the Eq. (5-13) and Eq. (5-14). An α-cut based approach 
[38] is used for the calculation. 
Eq. (5-13) 𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴 = min
∀𝑊𝑖∈[𝑊𝑖,𝑊𝑖]
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Eq. (5-14) 𝑌𝐿𝑊𝐴 = min
∀𝑊𝑖∈[𝑊𝑖,𝑊𝑖]
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
5.4. Universal Risk Matrix Method 
 
Figure 46 shows the flow of developing a universal risk matrix based on several 
risk matrices.  
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Figure 46. The flow to develop a fuzzy universal risk matrix. 
 
 
 
Step 1: Prepare the risk matrices. There are different types of risk matrices, or risk 
from different sources that need to be combined into one risk matrices. Figure 47 shows 
an example of a risk matrix. The vertical side is the Frequency, and the horizontal side is 
the Consequence. As explained in Table 17, the categories of each risk matrix elements 
(frequency, consequence, and risk) are described in linguistic terms. Risk is divided into 
4 categories, i.e., Not acceptable (NA), Tolerable not acceptable (TNA), tolerable (TA), 
acceptable (A); frequency is divided into 7 categories, i.e., Remote (A), Unlikely (B), Very 
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Low (C), Low (D), Medium (E), High (F), very High (G); consequence is divided into 5 
categories, i.e., Negligible (I), Low (II), Moderate (III), High (IV), Catastrophic (V). For 
each risk matrix elements, the total scales are defined either in numerical way or in 
descriptive methods.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 47. Risk matrix example I. 
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Table 17. Detail information of risk matrix example I.  
Risk matrix 
elements 
Scales Categories 
Frequency [10-8, 1]  {Remote (A), Unlikely (B), Very Low (C), Low 
(D), Medium (E), High (F), very High (G)} 
Consequence [1-5] {Negligible (I), Low (II), Moderate (III), High (IV), 
Catastrophic (V)} 
Risk [1-4] {Not acceptable (NA), Tolerable not acceptable 
(TNA), tolerable (TA), acceptable (A)} 
 
 
 
Step 2: Determine the interval type-2 fuzzy set based on survey. All the linguistic 
terms, as well as the weight of each risk matrix, are represented into interval type-2 fuzzy 
sets using the Interval Approach, which is described in section 5.3.1. Figure 48 shows an 
example of frequency of risk matrix I represented in interval type-2 fuzzy set. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48. Frequency of risk matrix I in fuzzy sets. 
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Step 3: Develop an Interval type-2 fuzzy risk matrix for each risk matrix. Once 
the interval type-2 fuzzy sets for all the linguistic terms are developed. Type-2 fuzzy logic 
modeling, described in Section 3.3.5, is conducted to transfer each risk matrix into a fuzzy 
risk surface. The inputs of the type-2 fuzzy model are frequency and consequence, and the 
output is risk. For the ease of the model, Sugeno fuzzy inference system is used. 
Step 4: Develop the universal risk matrix by aggregating all the interval type-2 
fuzzy risk matrices. With all the fuzzy risk matrices been developed, the final universal 
risk matrix is then obtained by aggregating they fuzzy risk matrices based on the weights. 
Linguistic weighted average, described in Section 5.3.2, is used for this step.  
 
5.5. Case Study 
 
A case study of developing a universal risk matrix by aggregating three risk 
matrices is given in this section. Figure 49 shows these three risk matrices. The vertical 
side is the Frequency, and the horizontal side is the Consequence. 
 
 
Figure 49. Three risk matrices. 
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With a scale for frequency, consequence, and risk separately, experts are asked to 
evaluate an interval for each linguistic terms. Here, the linguistic terms are the categories 
for frequency, consequence and risk. A group of n Subject Matter Experts will be asked 
the following question: 
Use an interval to describe a term: on a scale of __, what are the endpoints of the 
interval that you think best describe the word__? 
Using the Interval Approach, all the linguistic terms of frequency and consequence 
can be represented by interval type-2 fuzzy sets. A resultant risk matrix can be developed 
through type-2 fuzzy logic modeling. Sugeno fuzzy inference is used for the modeling. 
Figure 50 shows the resultant fuzzy risk matrix for risk matrix I, Figure 51 shows the 
resultant risk matrix for risk matrix II, and Figure 52 shows the resultant risk matrix for 
risk matrix III. 
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Figure 50. Type-2 fuzzy modeling and resultant risk matrix for risk matrix I. 
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Figure 51. Type-2 fuzzy modeling and resultant risk matrix for risk matrix II. 
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Figure 52. Type-2 fuzzy modeling and resultant risk matrix for risk matrix III. 
 
 
 
The weight of these three risk matrices were also accessed by the expert using the 
Interval Approach. Assume the final weight of these three risk matrices are shown in 
Figure 53. The weight is also an interval type-2 fuzzy set. 
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Figure 53. The weight of three risk matrices. 
 
 
 
With three fuzzy risk matrices and their weights, a universal risk matrix is 
developed using the Fuzzy Weighted Average approach. Figure 54 shows the final 
universal risk matrix. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54. The universal fuzzy risk matrix by aggregating three example risk matrices. 
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5.6. Conclusions 
 
1) Risk matrix is widely used in semi-quantitative risk assessment, and the development 
of a single risk matrix involves expert interpretation. There are significant 
uncertainties in traditional risk matrix, including poor resolutions, ambiguous input 
and output. 
2) Through fuzzy logic, the uncertainty from expert knowledge can easily be modeled. 
The method proposed in this section is based on interval type-2 fuzzy logic.  The new 
method proposed in this section focuses on increasing the precision of the risk matrix 
by quantifying the uncertainty. Type-2 fuzzy logic works better in analyzing intra-
personal and inter-personal uncertainties. 
3) Sometimes a universal or corporate-wide risk matrix is developed in attempt to 
standardize risk management across the company. The new method provides an 
efficient way to aggregate several risk matrices into one universal risk matrix. The 
resultant fuzzy risk matrix provides a high resolution.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This section summarizes the main findings of the work presented in this 
dissertation and it outlines the opportunities to continue this work. 
 
6.1. Conclusions 
 
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a widely used semi-quantitative risk 
assessment method. It provides a simplified and less precise method to assess the 
effectiveness of protection layers and the residual risk of an incident scenario. The 
outcome failure frequency and consequence of that residual risk are intended to be 
conservative by prudently selecting input data, given that design specification and 
component manufacturer’s data are often overly optimistic. There are many influences, 
including design deficiencies, lack of layer independence, availability, human factors, 
wear by testing and maintenance shortcomings, which are not quantified and are 
dependent on type of process and location. This makes the risk in a conservative approach 
usually overestimated. Therefore, to make decisions for a cost-effective protective system, 
different sources and types of uncertainty in the LOPA model need to be identified and 
quantified.  
There are different approaches to deal with uncertainty in engineering problems 
including statistics [58], fuzzy logic [59], sensitivity analysis, and expert method [60]. In 
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this study, fuzzy logic along with statistics is used for the uncertainty quantification in 
LOPA.  
As is known, risk is interpreted as a measure of the severity and probability of 
occurrence of an event. Besides the inherent uncertainty of risk, there is the possible spread 
in the derived values of both probability and consequence as a secondary source of 
uncertainty. A probabilistic and fuzzy logic hybrid approach is developed to deal with the 
uncertainty in frequency. An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based approach is developed to 
quantify the uncertainty in risk, and it also provides an efficient way to combine several 
risk matrices into one universal risk matrix. 
 
6.1.1. Uncertainty in the Frequency  
 
The hybrid approach (described in Section 4) adapts the advantages of both 
probabilistic and fuzzy logic approaches in quantifying the uncertainty in the frequency 
part of LOPA, including the frequency of initiating event, and probability of failure on 
demand (PFD) of independent protection layers (IPLs). A case study of the hybrid 
approach shows that a more accurate failure rate can be achieved with the available data 
and expert judgment. Uncertainty is quantified in terms of the distribution variance. 
Compared to a crisp value in traditional LOPA, a risk analyst can make a risk decision 
with more confidence. As shown in Figure 55, this method takes advantage of all available 
sources, i.e., generic database, plant-specific data, and expert judgment. In this 
probabilistic and fuzzy logic hybrid approach, when there are more data (generic database 
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and/or plant-specific data) the probability part will be dominating, and when there are less 
and expert judgment is used the fuzzy logic part will be dominating. It focuses on 
developing a new database reflecting a plant's processes, environments, maintenance 
practices, and equipment operation to facilitate a more accurate layer of protection 
analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55. Overview of the fuzzy and probabilistic hybrid approach. 
 
 
 
6.1.2. Uncertainty in the Risk 
 
Risk matrix is widely used in LOPA. There are significant uncertainties in 
traditional risk matrix, including poor resolutions, ambiguous input and output, etc. A 
type-2 fuzzy logic fuzzy risk matrix (described Section 5) is developed to increase the 
precision of the risk matrix. Compared with type-1 fuzzy logic, a higher degree of 
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approximation can be achieved in modeling real world problems. The establishment of 
interval type-2 fuzzy sets is based on survey to multiple experts.  
Sometimes a universal or corporate-wide risk matrix is developed in attempt to 
standardize risk management across the company. The new method provides an efficient 
way to aggregate several risk matrices into one universal risk matrix. Linguistic weighted 
average (described in Section 3.3.7) is in this method, and the aggregation is based on the 
weight of each risk matrix. The resultant fuzzy risk matrix provides a high resolution. 
 
6.2. Future Work 
 
Risk is interpreted as a measure of the severity and probability of occurrence of an 
event that causes consequences, and the uncertainty in risk and frequency are studied in 
this dissertation. The future work should focus on quantifying the uncertainty in 
consequence. There are many consequence indices, such as Dow F&EI, Edwards and 
Lawrence index, Heikkila and Hurme index, Khan and Amyotte index. For most indices, 
aggregations of different types of hazards (e.g., flammability, toxicity, explosion hazards, 
etc.) are based on a simple weighting sum method. There are different types of uncertainty 
in these indices to take into account.   
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